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MENTAL HEALTH COURTS AND TITLE II OF THE ADA:
ACCESSIBILITY TO STATE COURT SYSTEMS FOR INDIVIDUALS
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE NEED FOR DIVERSION

RONDA CRESS,* AND J. NEIL GRINDSTAFF,**
S. ELIZABETH MALLOY***

I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals with disabilities face a wide spectrum of unique challenges in
our society. In fact, people with disabilities face special problems in
exercising some of their most fundamental rights—rights that many in
American society take for granted. Access to the judicial system, a
fundamental right that has paramount importance in our society, can often
present obstacles to people with disabilities in a variety of significant ways.
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“Title II”) mandates
that state and local judicial facilities, and the provision of government
programs and services, when viewed in their entirety should be accessible to
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individuals with disabilities. 1 Furthermore, state and local government
programs that are recipients of federal funding are also subject to the mandates
of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), which
requires basically the same degree of accessibility as is required by Title II.
Federal judicial facilities are also subject to Sections 504 and 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act, but do not meet the definition of a “public entity” as it is
defined in the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and are therefore not
covered under Title II. 2
Analysis of the disability antidiscrimination legislation, implementing
regulations, technical assistance manual, applicable case law on judicial access
and the ADA’s protection of those with mental disabilities, and the policy
behind the creation of mental health courts suggests that mental health courts
may be successful in practice and withstand ADA scrutiny. In addition,
information on existing mental health courts in cities in Ohio and around the
country will help determine whether mental health courts can pass statutory
muster under the ADA by reducing recidivism and supplying people with
mental disabilities the treatment that they might not otherwise receive through
participation in the mainstream judicial system. Moreover, if people with
mental disabilities are not receiving adequate or sufficiently equal
opportunities within regular state court systems, mental health courts, or at
least some aspects of these courts or other similar remedies, are arguably
necessary requirements for state courts to be in compliance with ADA
mandates by being readily accessible to persons with mental disabilities.
In Part II, the paper gives a more detailed account of the background and
history of the disability antidiscrimination legislation that Congress has
enacted to counteract widespread discrimination against individuals with
physical and mental impairments in the United States. Closer examination of
the statutory language of the ADA, viewed in conjunction with Congress’
intent in passing the legislation, demonstrates how and why the statutory
protection should be applied to individuals with mental disabilities who are
seeking access to the judicial system at state and local levels. Additionally,
careful analysis of the Department of Justice’s regulations for the
implementation of Title II and the Technical Assistance Manual for Title II
(“TAM”) provides information intended to better instruct state court systems
as to their legal obligation to provide readily accessible services to individuals
with mental disabilities.
Part II also takes a closer look at the Supreme Court’s decision in
Tennessee v. Lane, 3 which dealt with whether Congress had § 5 authority to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against the states by enacting Title II,
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132 (West 2006).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (West 2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
3. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

MENTAL HEALTH COURTS AND TITLE II OF THE ADA

309

thereby abrogating states’ immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 4
Examination of the Court’s analysis in Lane indicates that Congress completed
a great deal of research and deliberation before drafting Title II to remedy the
systemic deprivation of fundamental rights to individuals based solely on the
fact that a person is physically or mentally disabled. The evidence of the
historical problem of discrimination in the provision of judicial accessibility to
persons with disabilities probably persuaded the Court that Title II was
congruent and proportional to the harm that it was enacted to prevent.
Part III discusses the historical context giving rise to the creation of mental
health courts and describes the first modern mental health courts. 5 Part IV
explores the challenges and criticisms faced by these specialty courts. 6 Part V
evaluates mental health courts under two integral concepts of Title II,
accessibility and integration, and it concludes that mental health courts may
withstand scrutiny under Title II. 7 Part VI then evaluates how the State of
Ohio is addressing the increase of defendants who are mentally ill in its
criminal justice system. 8 Finally, Part VII concludes that, despite the
imperfections of mental health courts, the goals and policies of these courts are
aligned with Congress’s intent in enacting Title II. 9 Moreover, if individuals
who have mental disabilities are denied sufficiently equal opportunities by a
state’s mainstream judicial system, then Title II may require that mental health
courts, or some other similar remedy, be provided so that the judicial system is
readily accessible to persons with mental disabilities.
II. STATUTORY PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION BASED ON
DISABILITIES: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Over the years, Congress has recognized that individuals with disabilities
face discrimination in almost every aspect of their lives. 10 To combat this
discrimination, Congress has invoked its powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment to help put individuals with disabilities on an equal playing field
with others in American society. 11 Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA in an effort to provide more expansive protection against
discrimination for individuals with physical and mental disabilities in the
United States. 12

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra notes 3-134 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 135-236 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 237-51 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 252-74 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 275-300 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 301-04 and accompanying text.
See 29 U.S.C. § 701(a) (West 2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (West 2006).
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).
29 U.S.C. § 701(b)-(c); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
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Background, Purpose, and Analysis of Claims Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990

The ADA stems from its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act. 13 The
Rehabilitation Act was enacted to protect against discrimination of disabled
individuals solely on the basis of their disability. 14 However, its scope was
limited to cover only state and local governments that received federal
funding. 15 Because many state and local programs, including many state court
systems, do not receive federal assistance, more expansive antidiscrimination
legislation was needed in order to protect individuals with disabilities from
being discriminated against by state and local governments and their agencies
in the provision of services, programs, and activities. 16 In 1990, Congress
promulgated the ADA, drawing from the language of the Rehabilitation Act,
with the express purpose of codifying a “national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” in all areas of society. 17
The ADA expanded upon the protection against disability discrimination
that the Rehabilitation Act had provided by including individuals, private
businesses, and organizations, as well as the government, under the auspices of
a disability antidiscrimination statute. 18 The ADA was enacted with the
express congressional intent of eliminating the utilization of fear and negative
stereotypes of the disabled from both employment decisions and in the
allocation of public services in the United States. 19 Congress clearly intended
to put persons with disabilities on an equal footing with the rest of society. 20
Congress noted in the ADA’s “findings” section that “some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is
increasing as the population as a whole is growing older . . . .” 21 Furthermore,
Congress declared that individuals with disabilities have historically faced
isolation and segregation within American society, and that this problem
persists in such “critical areas as employment, housing, public
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation,
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.” 22
Congress further noted that unlike other forms of invidious discrimination,
people with disabilities have had “no legal recourse to redress such
13. LAURA ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 18 (2002).
14. § 701(a)-(c).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b) (West 2006).
16. See Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 475-76 (1991).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12131(1), 12181(7) (West 2006).
19. § 12101(a)-(b)(1).
20. See § 12101(a)(8), (b)(1)-(2).
21. § 12101(a)(1).
22. § 12101(a)(2)-(3).
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discrimination.” 23
In addition, Congress found that individuals with
disabilities continue to encounter many forms of discrimination, and according
to census data, national polls, and other studies, persons with disabilities
“occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged
socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally,” and are therefore
a discrete and insular minority who have been . . . subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in,
and contribute to, society . . . . 24

Congress determined that the proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities in the United States are to “assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals . . . .” 25 Finally, Congress found that discrimination based on
disabilities “denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an
equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is
justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and non-productivity.” 26
Congress also explicitly stated that the ADA’s purpose was,
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing
the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with
disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities. 27
In reviewing ADA claims for unlawful disability discrimination, federal
courts must first determine whether an individual meets the statutory definition
of being “disabled.” 28 Next, the individual must be “otherwise qualified” to
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

§ 12101(a)(4).
§ 12101(a)(6)-(7).
§ 12101(a)(8).
§ 12101(a)(9).
§ 12101(b).
See 42 U.S.C. §12111(8) (West 2006).
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carry out the fundamental requirements of the program with or without
reasonable accommodations. 29
The individual must then prove that
discrimination has taken place and that they have been discriminated against
by an entity that is covered by the ADA. 30 These issues are quite complex and
the outcome of the analysis can vary greatly depending on the nature and
context of the claim.
1. Analysis for Being Considered “Disabled” Under the ADA
The ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability and defines a
disability for purposes of the statute as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 31
In determining whether or not an individual has a disability that is covered
by the ADA, the first step of the analysis is to determine whether or not there is
a physical or mental impairment. 32 The regulations that were issued by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) interpreting § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act are informative in making this determination. 33 The
HEW listed several specific conditions in defining “physical or mental
impairment” to mean:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory,
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or
(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities. 34

29. § 12111(8).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112(a)-(b) (West 2006).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (West 2006) (emphasis added). See Susan Stefan, Unequal Rights:
Discrimination Against People with Mentral Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
Washington, DC, American Psychological Association (June 2001).
32. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998).
33. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 (West 2006). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is the disability
antidiscrimination statute that predated and served as the basis for many provisions of the ADA.
See Laura Rothstein, Disability Law (2002).
34. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A)-(B).
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The HEW determined that it was not sensible to enumerate the number or
types of disabilities that should be covered by the statute because such an
enumeration might result in no coverage under the antidiscrimination statute
those not specifically mentioned by the legislation. 35
However, a
representative list of conditions that constitute physical or mental impairments
was contained in the commentary to the regulations, including “such diseases
and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral
palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease,
diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, and drug addiction and
alcoholism.” 36
Next, an evaluating court must look at the life activity that is affected by
the impairment and determine whether or not it is a major life activity. 37 The
third and final consideration for whether or not a person has a disability under
the ADA ties the first two parts of the analysis together by looking to see if the
impairment actually limits a major life activity. 38 The ADA also provides
protection for those who may not have a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity; if it can be demonstrated that they had
a previous record of, or are incorrectly regarded as having such an impairment
by the party who is discriminating against them. 39
Although through the ADA, Congress does provide protection for persons
who have had past drug and alcohol abuse problems, as long as those
individuals meet certain requirement, the statute’s definition of disability does
not include an individual who is “currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs,
when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.” 40 This distinction is
important for some defendants with mental disabilities, as it is not uncommon
for persons with mental disabilities to also suffer from alcohol or drug
addiction problems. 41
2. Otherwise Qualified
Title I of the ADA, concerning employment, and Title II, concerning the
allocation of public services, contain requirements that a disabled individual be

35. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A.
36. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A.
37. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631.
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(B)-(C) (West 2006).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12210(a)-(b) (West 2006) (emphasis added). These requirements for the
former drug and alcohol abuser include participating on a supervised rehabilitation program and
no longer engaging in the use of drugs or alcohol. Id.
41. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CO-OCCURRING MENTAL AND
SUBSTANCE ABUSE DISORDERS: A GUIDE FOR MENTAL HEALTH PLANNING + ADVISORY
COUNCILS 3 (2003), available at http://media.shs.net/ken/pdf/NMH03-0146/NMH03-0146.pdf
(last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
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“otherwise qualified,” with or without reasonable accommodations, in order to
come under the protection of the statute. 42 For purposes of determining
whether the ADA applies to a particular individual with a disability, Title II
defines that term in the following manner:
The term “qualified individual with a disability” means an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in
programs or activities provided by a public entity. 43

If a person does not meet the statutory definition of “qualified individual
with a disability[,]” then the ADA does not apply to them. Additionally, if a
person with a disability is determined to be a “direct threat” to the safety or
health of others, then he or she is also not considered to be otherwise qualified,
and is thus not protected by the ADA. 44
3. Major Life Activities
To meet the definition of disability for purposes of applying the ADA, an
individual must not only have a physical or mental impairment, but that
impairment must also substantially limit at least one of that individual’s major
life activities. 45 In holding that asymptomatic HIV/AIDS meets the definition
of a disability under the ADA framework, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bragdom
v. Abbott stated that “[t]he [ADA] statute is not operative, and the definition
not satisfied, unless the impairment affects a major life activity.” 46 The Court
went on to explain what should be considered as major life activities for
purposes of applying the ADA:
[T]he ADA must be construed to be consistent with regulations issued to
implement the Rehabilitation Act. Rather than enunciating a general principle
for determining what is and is not a major life activity, the Rehabilitation Act
regulations instead provide a representative list, defining the term to include
“functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” As the use of the
term “such as” confirms, the list is illustrative, not exhaustive. 47

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12131(2) (West 2006).
§ 12131(2).
42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (West 2006).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (West 2006).
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637, 639 (1998).
Id. at 638-39 (citations omitted).
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4. Substantial Limitation on Major Life Activity
In Bragdon, the Court gave further guidance as to the final element that
must be met before the ADA is applicable: whether an individual’s physical or
mental impairment poses a substantial limitation on the major life activity that
he or she asserts has been affected by the impairment. 48 In addressing the fact
that conception and childbirth are not completely foreclosed to an HIVpositive woman, the Court noted that “[t]he Act addresses substantial
limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities. . . . When significant
limitations result from the impairment, the definition is met even if the
difficulties are not insurmountable.” 49
Many of the mental impairments that are listed in the HEW regulations
above (any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities) and those that were mentioned by the Court in Bragdon, arguably
pose substantial limitations on several major life activities, including the ability
to care for oneself, work, take care of family obligations, interact with others,
etc., even if it were disputed that these life activities should be considered as
“major” for purposes of the statute. The ADA itself, the implementing
regulations discussed in more detail below, and the holdings of the Supreme
Court reinforce the determination that mental and developmental disorders are
qualifying impairments under the ADA.
B.

The Applicability of Title II to State Court Systems

Unlike its predecessor, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the
ADA prohibits discrimination based on disabilities by public entities, whether
or not they receive federal funding. 50 Public entities include “any department,
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or . . . local
government . . . .” 51 Title II can be used to protect the disabled in a variety of
ways, including the protection of voting rights by requiring accessible polling
stations and protection of the right of access to the courts by requiring
accessible courtrooms and courthouses. 52 Title II broadly states “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

48. Id. at 631.
49. Id. at 641.
50. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1)(A)-(B), 12132 (West 2006).
51. § 12131(1)(B).
52. See The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Voting: Federal Laws Can Overcome
Barriers to the Ballot, http://www.bazelon.org/issues/voting/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2006) (“The
effectiveness of the ADA has not yet been tested in several areas relating to voting rights of
people with mental disabilities. . . . [But one] case banned their improper exclusion from voting
through vague or overbroad competency standards and the need for reasonable accommodations
in the voting process.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

316

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:307

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities
of a public entity or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 53
Once an individual has a physical or mental disability meets the statutory
definition laid out in the previous section, state courts are required by Title II
to provide accessible judicial services to that individual. 54 Success in meeting
this requirement is evaluated by looking at a state’s court system as a whole.
In the next section, we utilize the Department of Justice’s guidance, as stated in
the ADA’s implementing regulations and in the explanations and illustrations
found in the Technical Assistance Manual (TAM), to evaluate the applicability
of Title II to state and local judicial systems in an effort to better instruct state
court systems as to their legal obligations for the provision of judicial services
to persons with mental disabilities.
1. The Implementing Regulations and Title II’s Technical Assistance
Manual
In 1991, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the agency
charged with interpreting Title II, issued Title II’s implementing regulations,
which include a more detailed interpretation of how the ADA is to be applied
to state and local governments. 55 In addition, the DOJ published the TAM that
is updated annually to help state and local governments with the
implementation and interpretation of the law. 56 The express purpose of the
TAM is “to present the ADA’s requirements for state and local governments in
a format that will be useful to the widest possible audience.” 57 The DOJ’s
regulations and accompanying preambles were “carefully reorganized to
provide a focused, systematic description of the ADA’s requirements. . . . [T]o
avoid an overly legalistic style without sacrificing completeness.” 58
The DOJ’s implementing regulations define the reach of Title II in such a
manner that it clearly includes state court systems:
The scope of title II’s coverage of public entities is comparable to the coverage
of Federal Executive agencies under the 1978 amendment to section 504,
which extended section 504’s application to all programs and activities
“conducted by” Federal Executive agencies, in that title II applies to anything a
public entity does. Title II coverage, however, is not limited to “Executive”

53.
54.
55.
56.

§ 12132.
See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 511 (2004).
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 (West 2006).
See THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL Introduction, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman2.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter “TAM”].
57. Id.
58. Id.
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agencies, but includes activities of the legislative and judicial branches of
State and local governments. 59

In Subpart B to the implementation regulations, which addresses the
general prohibition against discrimination that is codified in the ADA, the DOJ
explained that after reviewing the notice of proposed rule-making, numerous
commenters suggested that the proposed regulations should be amended to
include the requirement that law enforcement and court personnel be trained to
recognize the difference between criminal activity and mental disabilities,
including mental retardation, cerebral palsy, traumatic brain injury, mental
illness, or other disabilities such as deafness or the effects of seizures. 60 The
DOJ declined to mandate a training requirement for law enforcement or court
personnel, even though several disabled commenters gave personal statements
detailing serious abuse that they had suffered at the hands of law enforcement
personnel. 61 The DOJ instead remarked that behavior of this sort is already
considered unlawful, and rather than amend the regulation, the DOJ
encouraged the states that had not already adopted the Uniform Duties to
Disabled Persons Act to consider that approach to solve the problem of police
brutality and violence that is misdirected toward the mentally disabled. 62
The ADA clearly states that it is unlawful to discriminate against an
otherwise qualified individual with a physical or mental impairment. 63 The
TAM adopts the same definition of mental impairment that appeared in the
HEW regulations that were used in the implementation of the Rehabilitation
Act, as discussed in greater detail above. 64 For purposes of applying the ADA
and Rehabilitation Act, a mental impairment is defined as any “mental or
psychological disorder, such as retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional
or mental illness, or specific learning disabilities.” 65
When the HEW issued the regulations that implemented the Rehabilitation
Act, the DOJ “decided against including a list of disorders constituting
physical or mental impairments, out of concern that any specific enumeration
might not be comprehensive.” 66 However, the DOJ does explain in the TAM
for Title II that some characteristics are not meant to fall under Title II’s
protection, including “disadvantages attributable to environmental, cultural, or
economic factors . . . common personality traits such as poor judgment or a
quick temper, where these are not symptoms of a mental or psychological

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.102 (West 2006) (emphasis added).
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.130.
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.130.
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (West 2006).
See TAM, supra note 56, at II-2.2000.
Id.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 633 (1998).
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disorder.” 67 Additionally, for purposes of Title II, “[t]he phrase ‘physical or
mental impairment’ does not include homosexuality or bisexuality.” 68
The implementing regulations also explain that it is discriminatory under
Title II to deny a person with a mental disability the right to participate in or
benefit from the aid, benefit, or services that are provided by a state or local
government entity. 69 The regulations permit state and local governments
to develop separate or different . . . benefits, or services when necessary to
provide [disabled] individuals . . . with an equal opportunity to participate
in . . . the public entity’s programs or activities, but only when necessary to
ensure that the . . . benefits, or services are as effective as those provided to
others. . . . Even when separate or different . . . benefits, or services would be
more effective . . . a qualified [disabled] individual . . . still has the right to
choose to participate in the program that is not designed to accommodate
individuals with disabilities. 70

Title II requires a state or local government entity to make its programs
readily accessible in all cases, except where to do so would “result in a
fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in
undue financial and administrative burdens.” 71 This requirement is in contrast
to the obligations imposed under Title III of the Act, which “requires public
accommodations to remove architectural barriers where such removal is
‘readily achievable,’ or to provide goods and services through alternative
methods, where those methods are ‘readily achievable.’” 72 The DOJ
concluded in the ADA’s implementing regulations that
Congress intended the “undue burden” standard in title II to be significantly
higher than the “readily achievable” standard in title III. . . . [And that] the
program access requirement of title II should enable individuals with
disabilities to participate in and benefit from the services, programs, or
activities of public entities in all but the most unusual cases. 73

Furthermore, the TAM makes it clear that a public entity is not relieved of
its duty to make its facilities, programs, and services accessible simply because
no individuals with disabilities are known to live in the area served by the
entity. 74 If the ADA allowed this type of test for when public entities should
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

TAM, supra note 56, at II-2.2000.
Id.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i) (West 2006).
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (West 2006).
28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (West 2006).
DEP’T OF JUST., NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY IN STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES § 35.150 (Jan. 1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/
reg2.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006) [hereinafter “NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF
DISABILITY”].
73. Id.
74. TAM, supra note 56, at II-5.1000.
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be required to make their public facilities, programs, and services readily
accessible, it would have the inherent effect of discouraging individuals with
disabilities from moving to that particular area, thus subjugating the ADA’s
expressed purpose of achieving greater integration for individuals with
disabilities in American society.
The DOJ realized that implementation of Title II could be quite
burdensome on public entities, both financially and in terms of practicality. 75
For this reason, the ADA allows some public facilities, programs, and services
to go unaltered if they meet certain criteria. 76 The implementation regulations
explain that,
[a]lthough a public entity is not required to take actions that would result in a
fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in
undue financial and administrative burdens, it nevertheless must take any other
steps necessary to ensure that individuals with disabilities receive the benefits
or services provided by the public entity. 77

The DOJ set forth a number of methods by which program accessibility
can be achieved, including “redesign of equipment, reassignment of services to
accessible buildings, [and] assignment of aides.” 78 In recognition of the fact
that structural changes to facilities and significant alterations to programs and
services may not always be economically or administratively feasible, the
TAM states that the “public entity may, however, pursue alternatives to
structural changes [and significant alterations to programs and services] in
order to achieve program accessibility. Nonstructural methods include
acquisition or redesign of equipment, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, and
provision of services at alternate accessible sites.” 79 The TAM provides the
following instructive examples:
ILLUSTRATION 1: The office building housing a public welfare agency may
only be entered by climbing a flight of stairs. If an individual with a mobility
impairment seeks information about welfare benefits, the agency can provide
the information in an accessible ground floor location or in another accessible
building.
ILLUSTRATION 2: A public library’s open stacks are located on upper floors
having no elevator. As an alternative to installing a lift or elevator, library staff
may retrieve books for patrons who use wheelchairs. The aides must be
available during the operating hours of the library.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3).
28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3).
NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY, supra note 72, at § 35.150.
28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1).
TAM, supra note 56, at II-5.2000.
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ILLUSTRATION 3: A public university that conducts a French course in an
inaccessible building may relocate the course to a building that is readily
accessible. 80

The DOJ declared in the implementing regulations that alterations to
existing facilities, programs, and services “would in most cases not result in
undue financial and administrative burdens on a public entity.” 81 The DOJ
also concluded that all of a public entity’s available resources that are
earmarked for use in the funding and operation of a service, program, or
activity should be taken into account to determine whether or not the financial
and administrative burdens are undue. 82 The TAM gives an additional
explanation of the standard for determining whether an alteration is an undue
burden:
If an action would result in such an alteration or such burdens, the public entity
must take any other action that would not result in such an alteration or such
burdens but would nevertheless ensure that individuals with disabilities receive
the benefits and services of the program or activity. 83

The public entity has the burden of proving that compliance with Title II
would fundamentally alter the nature of a service, program, or activity or
would result in undue financial and administrative burdens. 84 Should a public
entity claim that the government would be unduly burdened by an alteration,
the head of the public entity, or his or her designee, must make this decision
and must provide a written statement of the reasons that he or she has come to
that conclusion. 85 In recognition of the fact that it is sometimes difficult to
determine who the head of a state or local entity actually is, the DOJ declared
in the implementing regulations that the determination shall be made by “a
high level official, no lower than a Department head, having budgetary
authority and responsibility for making spending decisions.” 86
An individual with a disability who objects to how a public entity has
treated them because of their disability can bring a complaint under the
procedures specified in the regulations. 87

80. Id.
81. NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY, supra note 72, at § 35.150.
82. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3).
83. TAM, supra note 56, at II-5.1000.
84. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3).
85. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3).
86. NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY, supra note 72, at § 35.150.
87. Title II provides specific remedial procedures for an individual who believes that he or
she, as an individual or as part of any specific class of persons, has been injured by the decision
(or lack thereof) by a public entity that alterations would be unduly burdensome. They are
instructed to file a complaint under the compliance procedures established in the implementation
regulations, which provide that a complainant should file a complaint with any federal agency
within 180 days. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.170(a)-(b). The TAM gives additional guidance for disabled
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In determining whether or not state court systems must comply with Title
II, it is important to note that Title II only applies to public entities that employ
more than 50 persons. 88 In regards to state court systems, the TAM
unequivocally resolves this issue by stating that because “all States have at
least 50 employees, all State departments, agencies, and other divisional units
are subject to title II’s administrative requirements applicable to public entities
with 50 or more employees.” 89
Since many state court systems, located both in large urban centers and in
small rural areas, are implementing mental health courts, the development of
this type of alternative judicial service is likely within the budgetary reach and
in the best interest of, state judicial systems.
2. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Applicability of Title II
to State Court Systems: Tennessee v. Lane
Since the ADA was enacted, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that Title II
does apply to state court systems. In Tennessee v. Lane, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that Title II’s abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity was a legitimate exercise of Congress’ enforcement power under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the fundamental right of access
to state courts. 90 While this decision dealt directly with physical access to
courtrooms and courthouse facilities for the physically disabled, 91 it is likely
that the Court’s decision should be applied to guarantee the mentally disabled
access to the state court systems as well.
Respondents George Lane and Beverly Jones, who were both paraplegics
that required the use of a wheelchair for mobility, sued the State of Tennessee

individuals, stating that a complaint may be filed in a variety of places, including with a Federal
agency that provides funding to the public entity that is the subject of the complaint, with a
Federal agency designated in the Title II regulation to investigate Title II complaints, or with the
Department of Justice. See TAM, supra note 56, at II-9.2000. Alternatively, an aggrieved party
can also bring a lawsuit in a Federal district court. Id. at II-9.1000. The TAM also provides that:
The Federal agency processing the complaint will resolve the complaint through informal
means or issue a detailed letter containing findings of fact and conclusions of law and,
where appropriate, a description of the actions necessary to remedy each violation. Where
voluntary compliance cannot be achieved, the complaint may be referred to the
Department of Justice for enforcement. In cases where there is Federal funding, fund
termination is also an enforcement option.
Id. at II-9.2000.
88. See TAM, supra note 56, at II-8.1000.
89. Id.
90. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004). For further discussion of this case, see
Timothy J. Cahill & Betsy Malloy, Overcoming the Obstacles of Garrett: An “As Applied”
Saving Construction for the ADA’s Title II, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 133 (2004).
91. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513, 533-34.
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and a number of Tennessee counties, claiming “that they were denied access
to, and the services of, the state court system because of their disabilities.” 92
Mr. Lane was compelled to appear by a state trial court to answer a set of
criminal charges on the second floor of a county courthouse that had no
elevator. 93 For his first appearance, Mr. Lane had crawled up the stairs in
order to get to the courtroom. 94 When he returned to the courthouse for a
subsequent hearing, he refused to crawl up the stairs and he also refused to
allow officers to carry him up to the second floor courtroom. 95 The judge had
Mr. Lane arrested for failing to appear at the hearing. 96
Ms. Jones was a certified court reporter in the State of Tennessee, who
claimed that she lost a great deal of work and the opportunity to participate in
the judicial process because she was unable to gain access to many county
courthouses. 97
In finding that Congress had acted within its enforcement power under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court described the breadth of Congress’
§ 5 power as follows:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever trends to enforce submission to the
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect
equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial
or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional
power. 98

The Court applied the “congruence and proportionality” test, in which
legislation is “valid if it exhibits ‘a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.’” 99 The
majority, by way of illustration, explained how previous cases before the Court
that dealt with Congress’ use of its § 5 power remedial were valid because the
injury or remedy that was meant to be prevented passed or failed the
congruence and proportionality test. 100
Probably most relevant to the Court’s analysis in Lane was its recent 2001
decision in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, a case in which the Court found that
the Eleventh Amendment bars private suits seeking monetary damages for
state violations of Title I of the ADA. 101 In Garrett, the Court concluded,
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 513.
Id. at 513-14.
Id. at 514.
Id.
Id.
Lane, 541 U.S. at 514.
Id. at 518, n.3 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880)).
Id. at 520 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
Id. at 521.
Id. at 514.
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“Congress’ exercise of its prophylactic § 5 power was unsupported by a
relevant history and pattern of constitutional violations.” 102 The Court in
Garrett left open the possibility that money damages for violation of Title II
may pass the congruence and proportionality test. 103 In Garrett, the Court
identified the constitutional right or rights that Congress sought to enforce by
enacting Title I as the prohibition against irrational disability discrimination. 104
The Lane Court noted that Title II seeks to enforce the same prohibition, but
unlike Title I, Title II also “seeks to enforce a variety of other basic
constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching
judicial review.” 105
The Court noted that the right of access to the court system is protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the Due Process and
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment; as well as a right to access to criminal proceedings
that is guaranteed by the First Amendment. 106
In Lane, the Court gave numerous examples that “document a pattern of
unequal treatment in the administration of a wide range of public services,
programs, and activities, including the penal system, public education, and
voting.” 107 The Court recognized that this pattern of discrimination continued
despite several federal and state legislative attempts to remedy the problem. 108
The Court also took note of the extensive deliberations and research that
went into drafting the ADA. 109 Through this research, Congress discovered
that many individuals from across the country were being excluded from
courthouses and court proceedings because of their disabilities:
102. Id. at 521 (citing Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368, 374 (2001)).
103. Lane, 541 U.S. at 514.
104. Id. at 522.
105. Id. at 522-23.
106. Id. at 523 (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court of Cal., County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1986); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
819, n.15 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 379 (1971)).
107. Id. at 525 & nn.11-13 (citing Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996 (6th Cir. 1999) (deaf inmate
denied access to sex offender therapy program allegedly required as precondition for parole);
LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 (4th Cir. 1987) (paraplegic inmate unable to access toilet
facilities); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (exclusion of mentally
retarded students from the public school system); Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me.
2001) (disenfranchisement of persons under guardianship by reason of mental illness); New York
ex. rel. Spitzer v. County of Delaware, 82 F. Supp. 2d 12 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (mobility-impaired
voters unable to access county polling places); Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Kan.
1999) (double amputee forced to crawl around the floor of a jail); New York State Assn. for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487, 504 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (segregation of
mentally retarded students with hepatitis B)).
108. Id. at 526.
109. Lane, 541 U.S. at 526.
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A report before Congress showed that some 76% of public services and
programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable
by persons with disabilities, even taking into account the possibility that the
services and programs might be restructured or relocated to other parts of the
buildings. Congress itself heard testimony from persons with disabilities who
described the physical inaccessibility of local courthouses. And its appointed
task force heard numerous examples of the exclusion of persons with
disabilities from state judicial services and programs, including exclusion of
persons with visual impairments from jury service, failure of state and local
governments to provide interpretive services for the hearing impaired, failure
to permit the testimony of adults with developmental disabilities in abuse
cases, and failure to make courtrooms accessible to witnesses with physical
disabilities. 110

This evidence of a systemic problem of discrimination against disabled
individuals influenced the Court in Lane to find that Congress’s determination,
as articulated in the ADA itself, “makes clear beyond peradventure that
inadequate provision of public services and access to public facilities was an
appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation.” 111
Next, the Court determined whether or not Title II was an appropriate
response to the history and pattern of disability discrimination in American
society. 112 The State of Tennessee urged the Court to find that Title II is
overbroad in that it attempts to regulate everything from schools, to voting
booths, to hockey arenas, to the courthouse. 113 The Court was not persuaded
“to examine the broad range of Title II’s applications all at once,” but rather
focused on the question presented in the case: “whether Congress had the
power under § 5 to enforce the constitutional right of access to the courts.” 114
The Court determined that “Congress’ chosen remedy for the pattern of
exclusion and discrimination described above, Title II’s requirement of
program accessibility, is congruent and proportional to its objective of
enforcing the right of access to the courts.” 115 While the Court recognized that
the remedy that Congress created in Title II is a powerful one, the majority also
noted that it is nevertheless limited:
Title II does not require States to employ any and all means to make judicial
services accessible to persons with disabilities . . . .
It requires only
“reasonable modifications” that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 527 (citations omitted).
Id. at 529.
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 530-31.
Lane, 541 U.S. at 531.
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service provided, and only when the . . . [person who is] seeking modification
is otherwise eligible for the service. 116

The majority also pointed out that Title II’s implementing regulations add
some insight into the limited reach of the requirement that public entities
should require readily accessible services. “[I]n no event is the entity required
to undertake measures that would impose an undue financial or administrative
burden, threaten historic preservation interests, or effect a fundamental
alteration in the nature of the service.” 117
The Court concluded “Title II, as it applies to the class of cases implicating
the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of
Congress’ § 5 authority to enforce the . . . Fourteenth Amendment.” 118
The Court clearly states that Title II is constitutional and enforceable as it
applies to the class of cases that implicate the fundamental right of access to
the courts. 119 Furthermore, in its analysis of the harm that Title II was enacted
to prevent, the Court cited several cases that involved the denial of access to
mentally disabled individuals to the court system, and also characterized this
denial as an unconstitutional deprivation of rights.
C. Title II Principles Relevant to Mental Health Courts
Two fundamental principles relevant to assessment of mental health courts
emerge from the above discussion of the TAM and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in Lane: equally effective access to mental health court programs and
integration.
First, the TAM explains that a state or local government entity’s services,
programs, or activities must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals
with disabilities. 120 The “program accessibility” standard is not limited to the
building of new structures or the creation of new programs, but it also applies
to all existing facilities, programs, and services of a public entity. 121 With
respect to persons with mental disabilities in the criminal justice context,
defining adequate accessibility for a criminal defendant may be difficult. For
instance, does accessibility mean simply a judicial determination of culpability
not skewed by misunderstandings and prejudices about mental disorders? Is
adequate access simply protection against being punished for manifestations of
a mental disability? Or does adequate access require something more, such as

116. Id. at 531-32.
117. Id. at 532.
118. Id. at 533-34 (emphasis added).
119. Id.; see also Goodman v. Georgia, 126 S.Ct. 877, 880-81 (2006) (ruling that the denial of
access to programs and aid by a prison “amount to ‘exclusion from participation in or . . . den[ial]
benefit of’ the person’s ‘services, programs or activities.’”).
120. TAM, supra note 56, at II-5.1000.
121. Id.
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substantive treatment in a separate mental health court program with specific
guidelines?
Second, integration is another key principle that must be considered when
determining whether the creation of separate mental health courts is in
compliance with the ADA. While state and local governments have the right
to create benefits and services especially for individuals with disabilities, Title
II requires that a public entity administer all services, programs, and activities
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals
with disabilities. 122
The TAM reiterates that one of the primary goals of the ADA is to include
disabled individuals in the “mainstream” of American society. 123 The TAM
explains that, under the ADA, an individual with a disability shall not be
denied the opportunity to participate in such programs or activities that are not
separate or different, notwithstanding the existence of separate or different
programs or activities provided in accordance with this section. 124
Furthermore, the implementing regulations state that there is no requirement
that an individual with a disability accept an accommodation, aid, service,
opportunity, or benefit that he or she chooses not to accept. 125 For these
reasons, it is important that individuals with mental disabilities who are
diverted into mental health courts have the choice to remain in the regular
court system.
When these provisions of the ADA’s implementing regulations are
considered in conjunction with one another, they operate to “prohibit exclusion
and segregation of individuals with disabilities and the denial of equal
opportunities enjoyed by others, based on, among other things, presumptions,
patronizing attitudes, fears, and stereotypes about individuals with
disabilities.” 126 Accordingly, state and local government entities must ensure
that their actions and decisions regarding the provision of public services are
based on an individual’s particular circumstances and “not on presumptions as
to what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot do.” 127 The TAM
is also instructive on this issue, as it states that while a public entity may offer
separate or special programs when necessary to provide disabled individuals
with equal opportunities to benefit from the programs, such programs “must,
however, be specifically designed to meet the needs of the individuals with
disabilities for whom they are provided.” 128

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at II-5.2000.
Id. at II-3.4000.
Id. at II-3.4300-3.4400.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e)(1) (West 2006).
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (West 2006).
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A.
TAM, supra note 56, at II-3.4100.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

MENTAL HEALTH COURTS AND TITLE II OF THE ADA

327

Although it may be acceptable in some circumstances to provide separate
services for the disabled, the implementing regulations make it very clear that
“[i]ntegration is fundamental to the purposes of the Americans with
Disabilities Act” and that “[p]rovision of segregated accommodations and
services relegates persons with disabilities to second-class status.” 129 The
TAM further provides that “[p]ublic entities should make every effort to ensure
that alternative methods of providing program access do not result in
unnecessary segregation.” 130 The TAM also provides an example that is
instructive for a state that wishes to create a mental health court system that
deals exclusively with individuals with mental disabilities:
A school system should provide for wheelchair access at schools dispersed
throughout its service area so that children who use wheelchairs can attend
school at locations comparable in convenience to those available to other
children. Also, where “magnet” schools, or schools offering different curricula
or instruction techniques are available, the range of choice provided to students
with disabilities must be comparable to that offered to other students. 131

It is important to remember that even if a public entity provides separate or
special programs that are designed to better meet the needs of the disabled,
individuals with disabilities cannot be denied the chance to participate in
similar programs that are created for the general public, without regard for
disability status.
The implementing regulations clearly establish this
interpretation of the statute by stating that “[s]eparate, special, or different
programs that are designed to provide a benefit to persons with disabilities
cannot be used to restrict the participation of persons with disabilities in
general, integrated activities.” 132
Concerns about these Title II principles, particularly integration, arise from
the idea of creating separate mental health courts. At first glance, mental
health courts segregate those defendants with qualifying mental disabilities.
However, voluntary entry into mental health court programs resolves this issue
because eligible defendants decide whether or not to enter the program and
may opt out at any time after entry. 133 In actuality, voluntariness can present a
difficult issue for two reasons: (1) can a defendant deemed incompetent, and
therefore eligible, really make a knowing and willful choice to enter the mental
health court program?, and (2) if the defendant is capable of making this
decision, is the option between the mental health court or jail really a

129. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A. See Ohlmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 US 581 (1999)
(requiring states to provide community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when
a mental health professional determines that such treatment is appropriate).
130. TAM, supra note 56, at II-3.4200.
131. Id.
132. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A.
133. See infra Part IV.
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choice? 134 This latter problem also arises with drug courts, where the choice
between a treatment program or incarceration seems like a coercive choice at
best.
Mental health courts face an additional challenge unique to their target
population in that a defendant may not really comprehend the choices being
made. Thus, while most mental health courts purport to be a voluntary option
for eligible defendants in theory, in reality this may not be the case. 135 Critics
take issue with this problem in particular, claiming that mental health courts
are not truly diversionary and may actually violate Title II. 136 If defendants
with mental disabilities have no real choice but to enter the mental health court
program, they may be disadvantaged by exclusion from the available activities
of the traditional criminal justice system. 137
Although this argument is certainly meritorious, it ignores a couple of
important factors. The abundant statistics about defendants with mental
disabilities in the regular criminal court indicate that the current criminal
justice system has failed miserably in its attempts to address the population
with mental disabilities that comes before it. 138 Thus, one is hard pressed to
understand how the traditional system, which on paper integrates persons with
mental disabilities but in reality acts to deny that group meaningful access to
the courts, is itself in compliance with the ADA. 139 Moreover, inmates
suffering from a severe mental illness may not be “qualified” to participate in
the criminal justice system programs or services if they are considered unstable
or deemed a threat to personnel or other inmates. 140 Individuals who need
those services may be denied in the traditional system, whereas in the mental
health courts eligibility hinges upon the level of offense, not stability, and in
fact, often requires that the defendant have a serious mental illness. 141 Thus,
while voluntariness presents a significant challenge to mental health courts,

134. See BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, NCJ 18254, EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR
MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FORT
LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE, SAN BERNARDINO, AND ANCHORAGE xi (2000), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182504.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) [hereinafter EMERGING
JUDICIAL STRATEGIES].
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 135-36 (2001).
137. Id. at 136.
138. See infra Part III.A.
139. See infra Part V.
140. Paula N. Rubin & Susan W. McCampbell, The Americans with Disabilities Act and
Criminal Justice: Mental Disabilities and Corrections, NAT’L INST. OF JUST.: RES. IN ACTION 1,
3 (July 1995), available at http://www.nicic.org/Library/serial479 (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
141. See infra Part III.B (describing the eligibility requirements of the first mental health
courts).
THE
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careful and thorough evaluation by courtroom teams can help alleviate this
concern while achieving compliance with Title II.
To further evaluate these questions about mental health courts under the
rubric of Title II, one first needs to know more about the background, policy
goals, structures, and outcomes of existing mental health courts.
III. MENTAL HEALTH COURTS
Part II suggests that a strong case may be made that interpretation of Title
II allows for mental health courts. In order to support this argument, more
must be known about mental health courts. The following sections explore
mental health courts, beginning with their historical underpinnings, and then
identify the policy goals, difficulties, and criticisms involved with these
entities. The article then analyzes these specialty courts under Title II and
provides a glimpse into Ohio’s treatment of persons with mental disabilities
within the criminal law context.
A.

Historical Context: Derivation of the Mental Health Court Concept

To reiterate, the ADA defines a mental impairment as “any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.” 142 A mental
illness can further be thought of as:
[A] group of disorders causing severe disturbances in thinking, feeling, and
relating. They result in substantially diminished capacity for coping with
ordinary demands of life. A mental illness can have varying levels of
seriousness. Identical illnesses can cause different reactions . . . at different
times in the same person. 143

Early applications of Title II focused solely on criminal facilities themselves,
namely jails and prisons. 144 The scope of the attention at that time emphasized
ways in which facilities conducted their programs, services, and activities in
order to insure that eligible inmates with mental disabilities were included in
accordance with Title II. 145 Despite this narrow, post-booking inquiry into
Title II compliance, however, practitioners realized that “[p]rosecution and
incarceration are inappropriate responses to symptoms of mental illness” and
that community diversion programs incorporating multidisciplinary

142. EEOC, Technical Assistance Manual for the Americans with Disabilities Act § 2.2(a)(i)
(1992).
143. Rubin & McCampbell, supra note 140, at 1-2 (quoting Gerard R. Murphy, Police
Executive Research Forum, Managing Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Curriculum Guide for
Police Trainers, 2-5 (1989)).
144. See id. at 1.
145. Id. at 2.
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cooperation are more suitable for assisting persons with mental disabilities. 146
Additionally, practitioners also noted the need for “better and more effective”
approaches for handling the needs of inmates with mental disabilities. 147
The statistics concerning persons with mental illnesses in the criminal
justice system are staggering. As of 2004, approximately 1.3 million people
were in state and federal prisons, while an incredible thirteen million people
were jailed annually, with 631,000 inmates serving jail time. 148 Individuals
with serious mental illnesses comprised seven percent of those incarcerated at
the federal level and sixteen percent at the state level, with approximately
93,000 in prisons, 44,000 in jail, and 320,000 under corrections supervision, 149
generally for non-violent offenses and misdemeanors. 150 The demographics
for this group present a grim picture. Individuals in this group typically are
poor, uninsured, disproportionately members of minority groups, homeless,
suffering with co-existing substance abuse problems and mental disorders, and
are likely to be repeatedly shuffled through the mental health, substance abuse,
and criminal justice systems. 151 The percentage of women and juveniles with
mental disabilities entering these systems is also on the rise. 152
Several factors account for disproportionate numbers of persons with
mental disabilities in the criminal justice system. During the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s, deinstitutionalization programs placed many individuals with mental
disabilities into the community. 153 Simultaneously, the community mental
health system failed to effectively absorb and treat these individuals. 154
Furthermore, the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s witnessed an increase in
homelessness, a population also notoriously overrepresented by individuals
with mental disabilities. 155 The latter two decades also experienced the “War
Against Drugs,” with law enforcement cracking down on drug offenders, many
of whom also suffer from mental illness concurrently with a substance abuse

146. Id. at 2, 4.
147. Id. at 6.
148. NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, DHHS PUB. NO. SMA-04-3880,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: BACKGROUND PAPER 1 (2004), available at
http://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/papers/CJ_ADACompliant.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2006) [hereinafter “BACKGROUND PAPER”].
149. Id.; EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 2.
150. Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental Illnesses:
The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 U. D.C. L. REV. 143, 145 (2003).
151. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 148, at 1; NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL
HEALTH, ACHIEVING THE PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA,
FINAL REPORT 32 (2003), available at http://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/
FinalReport/toc.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) [hereinafter “ACHIEVING THE PROMISE”].
152. ACHIEVING THE PROMISE, supra note 151, at 32.
153. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 2.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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problem. 156 As a result of these events, many persons with mental disabilities,
who were unable to function successfully on their own, landed in the criminal
justice system. 157
Not surprisingly, during the heightened attention on drug enforcement, the
number of drug-related arrests and prosecutions increased. 158 The large
amount of drug offenders in the criminal justice system, coupled with
overcrowding in jails and prisons, prompted the creation of specialty drug
courts to channel some of these offenders out of the criminal justice system. 159
Emergence of the drug courts ushered in a paradigmatic shift from the typical
“process and punish” philosophy of the criminal justice system to a
therapeutic, treatment-oriented philosophy. 160 The goal of this approach was
to target and treat the underlying root cause of the crime – substance abuse. 161
Instead of doing this by incarceration, which did little to effectively treat the
substance abuse, the policy-makers behind the drug courts aimed to
incorporate a multi-disciplinary team of drug treatment professionals, health
care professionals, social workers, and criminal justice professionals, with
judges playing a key role as leader and supervisor. 162 Placement of the judge
in the driver’s seat of a therapeutic approach to drug treatment also marked a
new way of thinking; normally, judges ruled with a “hands-off” manner. 163
The bifurcation of eligible drug offenders from standard criminal courts into
drug courts, as well as the general concept of separate courts for special
categories of offenders, spread throughout the nation. 164 Given the common
co-occurrence of substance abuse and mental illness, as well as the inability of
criminal courts to effectively address the issues of offenders with mental
disabilities, contemplation of mental health courts was inevitable.
Despite the current increase in attention on defendants with mental
disabilities, the issues accompanying these individuals in the criminal justice
setting are nothing new. During the 1960s two courts, one in Chicago and one
156. Id.
157. Id. see Grant H. Morris, Pursuing Justice for the Mentally Disabled, 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 757 (2005); Jennifer S. Bard, Re-arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the
Incarceration of Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical and
Constitutional Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to the
Insanity Defense, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2005).
158. Id.
159. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 3. Dade County, Florida initiated
the first drug court in 1989. Id. at 4.
160. Id.; Henry J. Steadman, Susan Davidson, & Collie Brown, Mental Health Courts: Their
Promise and Unanswered Questions, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 457, 457 (2001), available at
http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/52/4/457.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 5.
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in New York City, portrayed the early outlines of mental health courts. 165 The
Municipal Court of Chicago, aided by the Psychiatric Institute, presided over
misdemeanors. 166
The Psychiatric Institute made determinations of
competency, and the court could recommend diversion alternatives to
incarceration, such as probation conditioned on outpatient therapy or civil
commitment. 167 The New York City court was similar, although its
determinations were generally made at the arrest phase rather than the
dispositional phase like the Chicago court. 168 In most instances, however, any
“alternatives” hinged on the offender’s competency, and a finding of
“incompetent” usually resulted in either voluntary or involuntary
commitment. 169 Today, the criminal justice system continues to struggle with
persons with mental disabilities, particularly because many require integrated
treatment for substance abuse as well as for the mental illness, many are poor
and cannot afford their medication, and law enforcement officers are often illequipped to deal with situations involving persons with mental disabilities. 170
These difficulties, as well as the escalating population of offenders with mental
disabilities, overcrowded facilities, success of drug courts, and shift in judicial
philosophy, paved the way for modern-day mental health courts.
B.

Contemporary Mental Health Courts: Policies and Models

The new “therapeutic jurisprudence,” which has been embraced by
specialty courts, particularly mental health courts,
reflects a focus on “the extent to which legal rule or practice promotes the
psychological and physical well-being of a person subject to legal
proceedings” as well as an “exploration of ways mental health and related
disciplines can help shape the law” and concern with “the roles of lawyers and
judges in producing therapeutic . . . consequences for individuals involved in
the legal process. 171

This therapeutic focus translates into the following two goals of mental health
courts: (1) “break the cycle of worsening mental illness and criminal behavior
that begins with the failure of the community mental health system and is

165. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 5-6.
166. Id. at 6.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. Incompetent misdemeanor offenders had the option of voluntary civil commitment,
whereas incompetent felony offenders were committed by mandate. Id.
170. Id. at 7; Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 150, at 145 (stating that “[d]uring street
encounters, police officers are almost twice as likely to arrest someone who appears to have a
mental illness. A Chicago study of thousands of police encounters found that 47 percent of
people with a mental illness were arrested, while only 28 percent of individuals without a mental
illness were arrested for the same behavior”).
171. Steadman et al., supra note 160, at 457.
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accelerated by the inadequacy of treatment in prisons and jails,” and (2)
“provide effective treatment options instead of the usual criminal sanctions for
offenders with mental illnesses.” 172 Commentators agree that the way to
achieve this is via community-based services geared toward diversion of the
criminal justice system. 173 Thus far, mental health courts structurally diverge
in their attempts to achieve these goals. The first contemporary mental health
courts created in Broward County (Fort Lauderdale), Seattle, San Bernardino,
and Anchorage, attempted to concretely address the shortcomings of the
criminal justice system and the needs of offenders with mental disabilities. 174
1. The Broward County (Fort Lauderdale) Mental Health Court
In 1997, Broward County became the first county in the nation to establish
a mental health court. 175 Circuit court Judge Mark Speiser spearheaded an
inquiry into the plight of defendants with mental disabilities in the criminal
justice system by leading the Criminal Justice Mental Health Task Force,
which was formed in 1994. 176 The task force, comprised of individuals across
various disciplines, reached the same conclusions discussed above – the
normal criminal justice approach worked poorly with respect to its population
of persons with mental disabilities. 177 In response to these findings, the mental
health court was formed and organized as follows.
First, the defined goals for the court are to “expedite case processing,
create effective interactions between [the] mental health and criminal justice
systems, increase access to mental health services, reduce recidivism, improve
public safety, [and] reduce [the] length of confinement of mentally ill
offenders.” 178 The mental health court is designed to intervene after arrest for

172. Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 150, at 148. See also Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing
Profession: The Comprehensive Law Movement, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2006).
173. Id.; BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 148, at 5. See also Susan Stefan & Bruce J.
Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 507 (2005)
(providing an excellent introduction to mental health courts); LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the
Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for
Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 373 (2000).
174. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at vii. For an excellent discussion of
the important role of therapeutic jurisprudence in the development of mental health courts, drug
treatment courts and juvenile courts, see Bruce J. Winick and David B. Wexler, Judging in a
Therapeutic Key: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Courts (Carolina Academic Press) (2003).
For a more thorough discussion see Gregory L. Acquanva, Comment, Mental Health Courts: No
Longer Experimental, 36 SETON HALL LAW REV. 971 (2006).
175. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 9; Judge Randy T. Rogers, Mental
Health Courts: Fad or Future? 2 (July 2005), http://www.butlercountyprobatecourt.org/pdf/
Mental%20Health%20Courts%20-Illustrated.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
176. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 9; Rogers, supra note 175, at 2-3.
177. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 9; Rogers, supra note 175, at 3.
178. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xvii.
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offenders who suffered from a serious mental illness, organic brain
impairment, or developmental disability, who committed misdemeanors and
non-violent felonies. 179 Eligible defendants gain entry into the mental health
court before the disposition of the charges in order to divert the defendant. 180
Potential defendants are generally identified within twenty-four hours of arrest
or very shortly after a referral from a magistrate, county jail, family member,
etc. and subjected to a competency evaluation from a private psychiatrist.181
The judge has the ultimate authority to determine eligibility, with input from
the “courtroom team” consisting of the judge, prosecutor, public defender,
court monitor, court clinician, case manager, and mental health court liaison
before resolution of the charges. 182
Once a defendant is deemed eligible, a treatment plan is created by the
“courtroom team,” and a defendant undergoing treatment may be monitored up
to a year, with progress hearings held frequently. 183 During the defendant’s
treatment, the arrest charges are suspended, and if a defendant requests a
traditional trial at any time, he will be transferred to a traditional criminal court
but may still receive community-based treatment via the mental health court
team. 184 Noncompliance with a treatment plan rarely results in the use of jail
time as a sanction. 185 Instead, the court may respond by increasing hearings
before the judge, changing the treatment plan, and increasing support and
encouragement in keeping in sync with a therapeutic, as opposed to punitive,
perspective. 186 A defendant may be unfavorably terminated, however, if he
“commits [a] serious new crime, [has] repeated willful violations, or wants to
get out of [the] program.” 187 Under this scenario, the normal sentencing
options are available to the judge. 188
Misdemeanor defendants who
successfully complete their treatment program generally receive deferred
prosecution, may withdraw their guilty pleas, and avoid having a conviction
listed on their record. 189 Guilty pleas are entered for more serious offense
defendants, but those who successfully complete their mental health treatment
179. Id. The eligible misdemeanor offenses excluded DUIs and domestic violence. Id.
Persons with mental disabilities who committed misdemeanor battery offenses were eligible only
with the victim’s consent. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at xviii.
182. Id. See also Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, The Louisa Van Wezel Schwartz
Symposium Criminalization of People with Mental Illnesses: The Role of Mental Health Courts in
System Reform, 7 U. D.C. L. REV. 143 (2003).
183. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xix.
184. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xix.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at xx.
188. Id.
189. Id. at xix.
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program receive credit for time served. 190 The structure of the Broward
County mental health court served as the model for later mental health courts.
2. The King County (Seattle) Mental Health Court
Inception of the King County mental health court was strongly influenced
by the Broward County mental health court. 191 Unlike the Broward County
mental health court, which was motivated by general increases in the
incarcerated population of persons with mental disabilities, King County’s
attention to the same issue arose with a specific incident – the random murder
of its fire department captain by an offender with a mental disability in
1997. 192 The offender turned out to be a misdemeanor defendant deemed
incompetent by the municipal court and released shortly before the murder. 193
Subsequently, the county formed a task force to improve upon the system’s
handling of defendants with mental disabilities. 194
The goals of the King County Mental Health Court are identical to those of
the Broward County mental health court, but the structure it uses to achieve
those goals differs in some ways. 195 The mental health court intervention is
available at the plea/sentencing hearing stage, rather than immediately after
arrest, and a defendant must enter a plea in order to enter the program. 196 Like
the Broward County court, the King County mental health court is only
available to defendants who have committed misdemeanors, and defendants
must suffer from a “serious mental illness or developmental disability that
triggers [the] charged crime.” 197 The county jail screens the defendant for
signs of mental illness within the first forty-eight hours of arrest but prior to
the first court hearing. 198 Defendants may be referred to the mental health
court by the county jail, magistrate, family, police, etc., and the defendant
usually appears before the mental health court within twenty-four hours after
referral. 199 A state hospital psychiatrist conducts the competency evaluation in
190. Id. at xix. See also Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U.
L. REV. 1 (2003).
191. Rogers, supra note 175, at 2-3. Although the Anchorage mental health court technically
began operation prior to the King County mental health court, in reality King County was the
second county in the nation to research and consider implementation of such a court. See id.;
EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xvii.
192. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 21.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id. at xvii-xx.
196. Id. at xvii.
197. Id. However, like the Broward County court, the King County court will allow
misdemeanor defendants to enter the program if they have a felony in their criminal history, but
violent offenses are considered on a case-by-case basis. Id.
198. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xviii.
199. Id.
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the county jail, unless the defendant is hospitalized. 200 Again, the judge has
the ultimate authority to determine eligibility, with input from a team
consisting of the judge, prosecutor, public defender, program manager, court
monitor, jail psychiatric liaison, and probation officer. 201
Eligible defendants begin an interim treatment plan before the charges are
resolved, and the defendant must return after a couple of weeks to resolve the
charges. 202 Once regular treatment commences, the defendant usually has a
two-year probationary period supervised by a probation officer and the mental
health staff at the treating facility, while a court monitor supervises the
treatment plan itself. 203 Unlike the Broward County court, defendants in the
King County mental health court program typically have convictions on their
record at the conclusion of treatment, but the sentence gets suspended. 204 In
the rare cases where sentencing dispositions are deferred, defendants who
successfully complete the program may have their charges dismissed. 205
Regular hearings are held to monitor the defendant’s progress. 206 If the
defendant does not comply with the treatment plan, the judge first increases the
number of counseling sessions and court hearings but may use jail time to
sanction the defendant as a last resort. 207 Additionally, defendants who request
to go to trial after acceptance by the mental health court lose their eligibility
for the mental health court and are referred back to the regular criminal
court. 208
As mentioned above, defendants who successfully complete the program
usually receive credit for time served and retain the guilty plea on their
record. 209 In some cases, successful defendants may receive deferred
prosecution, withdraw their pleas, and get their charges dismissed on a
recommendation by the district attorney. 210 Defendants who repeatedly and
willfully violate their treatment plans or commit a serious new crime during
the program are terminated from the mental health court, and the original
charges are transferred back to the regular criminal court. 211

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at xix.
EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xix.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xix.
Id. at xx.
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3. The Anchorage, Alaska Mental Health Court
The backdrop prompting the adoption of Anchorage’s mental health court
in 1998 was even more bleak than that of the rest of the country. As much as
one-third of Alaska’s incarcerated population consisted of inmates with mental
disabilities, largely suffering from serious mental illnesses like developmental
disabilities and organic brain injuries. 212 A commission set up to examine
overcrowding in Anchorage jails identified persons with mental disabilities as
a particular difficulty within the system. 213 This finding prompted formation
of a pilot program to divert defendants with mental disabilities from the
criminal justice system and, ultimately, a mental health court was created in
1998, modeled after the Broward County and King County systems. 214
The goals, stage of intervention, criminal offense and criminal history
eligibility, method of entry, and referral processes of the Anchorage court are
identical to those of the King County mental health court discussed above. 215
The Anchorage system differs, however, in that it involves two programs – the
Jail Alternative Services (“JAS”) program for individuals with mental
disabilities already incarcerated, and the Court Coordinated Research Project
(“CCRP”), which resembles the prior two mental health courts by dealing with
misdemeanants in the adjudication process. 216
Participation in the JAS program requires that inmates be suffering from a
“major mental illness with history of psychosis.” 217 Eligibility for the CCRP is
broader, encompassing not only those individuals diagnosed with a serious
mental illness, developmental disability, or organic brain syndrome, but also
individuals exhibiting signs of such a condition. 218 The courtroom team for the
programs consists of the judge, prosecutor, public defender, and JAS case
coordinator. 219 The county jail conducts the initial screening of each
defendant, usually within twenty-four hours of arrest and before
arraignment. 220 For the competency evaluation, defendants in police custody
are referred to the state hospital, and those defendants not in custody must
schedule an independent evaluation. 221 If a defendant is still incompetent
ninety days after the initial competency exam, the court reevaluates the

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id. at xvii-xviii.
EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 35-36.
Id. at xvii.
Id.
Id. at xviii.
Id.
Id.
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situation and may dismiss the charges, particularly if the defendant was civilly
committed. 222
Like the judges in the previous two mental health courts, the judge in the
Anchorage system makes the final eligibility determination using the input of
the courtroom team. 223 If a defendant is eligible, a treatment plan is
formulated as a condition of probation following the sentencing hearing. 224
The typical treatment probation period for individuals in the Anchorage mental
health court system, three to five years, is much longer than that of the other
mental health courts. 225 In some misdemeanor cases it may run as long as ten
years. 226 Participants in the CCRP are monitored solely by the court and
prosecutor, and JAS participants are frequently and closely monitored by a
caseworker. 227 Defendants who successfully complete the treatment usually
still have the conviction on their record but receive a suspended sentence;
while those few who receive deferred dispositions receive a dismissal of their
charges. 228 Defendants who request trial can still receive treatment from the
CCRP but proceed before a judge functioning in dual roles as a CCRP judge
and a regular criminal judge. 229 Defendants who have minor violations of their
treatment plan receive adjustments in their treatment; however, jail time is
used as a threat, and when repeated efforts at counseling fail, the defendant
may be jailed. 230 Defendants’ participation in the program may be terminated
for perpetration of a new serious crime or willful and repeated violations of
their treatment plan, and if this occurs, the original charges are referred to the
regular criminal court. 231
4. The San Bernardino, California Mental Health Court
The conditions stimulating the creation of the San Bernardino mental
health court in 1999 were the same as those leading to the formation of the
previous three courts – an increase of defendants with mental disabilities in the
criminal justice system as a result of deinstutionalization and failure within the
community-based mental health system. 232 Specifically, persons with mental
disabilities comprised 12% of the San Bernardino local jail population. 233
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EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xviii.
Id.
Id.
Id. at xix.
Id.
Id.
EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xix.
Id.
Id.
Id. at xx.
Id. at 49.
Id.
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Again, the goals, structure, and eligibility requirements of this court are
nearly identical to those of the courts discussed above. 234 However, the San
Bernardino court differs in several key ways. First, the court considers lowlevel felony offenders, rather than just misdemeanor offenders, for
eligibility. 235 Regarding misdemeanants, though, the court will only consider
ones with a prior record. 236 The court carefully screens any defendants with a
violent felony in their prior criminal history. 237 Second, the court only
receives referrals from the county jail, not outsiders. 238 Third, the judge does
not have the ultimate say in a defendant’s eligibility for the treatment program
– admission to the program requires the consensus of all of the court team
members: the judge, prosecutor, public defender, mental health court
administrator, case managers, and probation officer. 239 Treatment begins
immediately while the individual is still in jail, but the defendant is typically
released to the program after the first court appearance. 240 The sanctions for
noncompliance available to the mental health court judge range “from
reprimands by [the] judge to stricter treatment conditions, community service,
and jail, which are used liberally.” 241 The final major difference from this
program and the others is that the charges are dismissed for defendants who
successfully finish the treatment, and they may also petition for their record to
be expunged. 242
These pioneering mental health courts, though differing organizationally,
clearly began in response to common, recurring problems: inadequate handling
of persons with mental disabilities by both community-based and criminal
justice systems, an increase in the number of substance abusers with mental
disabilities, and the resulting increase in the number of persons with mental
disabilities cycling through the criminal justice system. 243 Despite the
innovativeness of these specialty courts, problems and criticisms have arisen.

234.
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See EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xvii-xx.
Id. at xvii.
Id.
Id.
Id. at xviii.
Id.
EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xviii.
Id. at xix.
Id.
See BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, A GUIDE TO
MENTAL HEALTH COURT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 3 (May 2005), available at
http://www.nicic.org/Library/020757 (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) [hereinafter “GUIDE TO MENTAL
HEALTH”].
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IV. MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: CHALLENGES AND CRITICISMS
The formation of mental health courts increased across the country
following the success of drug courts and the inception of the Broward County,
King County, Anchorage, and San Bernardino mental health courts. 244 Today,
over 100 mental health courts exist throughout the United States. 245 As with
any new entity, however, mental health courts face practical challenges to
effectuating their goals, creating some skepticism.
A key component of mental health courts is identifying the “target
population” as early in the process as possible in order to intervene with the
appropriate treatment. 246 Equally important, however, is the need to accurately
assess a defendant while maintaining confidentiality. These needs – speed,
accuracy, and confidentiality – often conflict during the screening process for
the following reason:
Early intervention by the mental health court depends on timely and accurate
information about the defendants’ criminal justice and mental health
backgrounds. However, the goal of early intervention and prompt treatment
conflicts in part with the need for confidentiality and for consent by the
defendants to share the mental health information with the court staff. 247

Implementing procedures that adequately address these issues presents a
difficult dilemma from the outset.
Another difficulty faced by mental health courts is reconciliation of
criminal justice goals with mental health treatment goals. 248 The creation of
mental health courts reflects a paradigmatic shift toward therapeutic goals, but
the purposes of the criminal justice system (e.g. punishment, deterrence,
retribution, etc.) must also be addressed. As noted above, however,
punishment is often inappropriate and ineffective for the root causes of
mentally ill defendants’ transgressions. Nonetheless, many mental health
courts evince a hybrid of both systems’ goals by retaining punitive sanctions as
a last resort to noncompliance with treatment. 249
Achieving uniformity in composition and in defining success also impose
obstacles to mental health courts. For example, the four original mental health
244. See id.
245. Id.; Rogers, supra note 175, at 4. See also Acquaviva, supra note 174 (providing
overview of new mental health courts).
246. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at x. See Allison D. Redlich,
Voluntary, But Knowing and Intelligent?: Comprehension in Mental Health Court, 11 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 605 (2005).
247. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at x-xi.
248. Id. at xii. For a thorough critique of mental health courts, see Tammy Seltzer, Mental
Health Courts: A Misguided Attempt to Address the Criminal Justice System’s Unfair Treatment
of People with Mental Illnesses, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 570 (2005).
249. See supra Part III. See also Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions are not Enough:
Problem-solving Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459 (2004).
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courts varied to some degree in their structure and eligibility requirements. 250
Likewise, since each individual grapples with dissimilar problems related to
the mental illness, one defendants’ success will necessarily differ from another
defendants’ success. 251 Some critics view this fact as a red flag to the rapid
expansion of mental health courts. 252 Drug courts also dealt with uniformity
issues in the beginning but were eventually unified, unlike mental health
courts:
[D]rug courts rapidly moved to a common model aided by technical assistance
and information on program models from national sources – the Office of
Justice Programs’ Drug Courts Program Office of the U.S. Department of
Justice, American University’s National Technical Assistance Center, and the
National Association of Drug Court Professionals. Unlike drug courts, mental
health courts have no such infrastructure or model. Any similarities among
current mental health courts occur more or less by chance at the
implementation level and stem mostly from mirror-imaging by new
jurisdictions seeking to replicate recently visited mental health courts or to
duplicate drug courts.
....
. . . [A]lmost any special effort by the courts to better address the needs of
persons with serious mental illness who engage with the criminal justice
system can qualify as a mental health court by current standards. In its
diffusion, the [mental health court] concept has come to have little meaning.
....
Until similar evidence-based conclusions [to that of drug courts] about
appropriate structures and interventions are available for mental health courts,
some pause may be advisable before widespread implementation. 253

In recognition of this criticism, proponents of mental health courts responded
by articulating a general definition of a mental health court as follows:
A specialized court docket for certain defendants with mental illnesses that
substitutes a problem-solving model for traditional court processing.
Participants are identified through specialized screening and assessments, and
voluntarily participate in a judicially supervised treatment plan developed
jointly by a team of court staff and mental health professionals. Incentives
reward adherence to the treatment plan and other court conditions, nonadherence may be sanctioned, and success or graduation is defined according
to specific criteria. 254

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See supra Part III.
EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xii.
See generally Steadman et al., supra note 160.
Id. at 457-58.
GUIDE TO MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 243, at 2.
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Furthermore, proponents have outlined ten essential elements a mental health
court should possess to achieve success: (1) Goals, (2) Target Population, (3)
Confidentiality, (4) Terms of Participation, (5) Informed and Voluntary
Choice, (6) Participant Identification, (7) Integration of Treatment and
Community Supports, (8) The Court Team, (9) Monitoring Adherence to Court
Conditions, and (10) Sustainability. 255 How these elements are incorporated
structurally should necessarily be left to each court based on system needs and
the demographics of the particular jurisdiction.
The final major challenge presented to mental health courts is one common
to any organization – resources. Part of the problem contributing to the
increase of mentally ill persons’ entrance into the criminal justice system, as
well as that system’s failure to adequately deal with the population of persons
with mental disabilities, is a lack of resources and training. Ironically, mental
health courts rely, at least to some extent, on these same community-based
resources in their treatment plans. 256 Critics assert that, despite good
intentions, mental health courts may face the same doom as the traditional
criminal system unless funding and resources are greatly improved. 257
As with any innovative concept, mental health courts face difficulties and
critiques. As mental health courts continue to be implemented, attempts to
remedy and adjust to these difficulties will undoubtedly be made. Moreover,
more empirical studies of mental health court outcomes are warranted to aid in
tweaking the mental health court system. In the meantime, the visible
successes and failures of existing mental health courts help shape future courts
and programs. Ohio’s current experiment with the diversion of defendants
with mental disabilities is one such reflection of these concepts. 258
V. ANALYSIS OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS UNDER TITLE II
Persons with mental disabilities can present major challenges to law
enforcement personnel who sometimes mistake manifestations of mental
illness for criminal activity and to state court systems that must then try to deal
with persons with mental disabilities in an appropriate manner. Obviously,
some training in dealing with people with mental disabilities would be of great
benefit to the law enforcement and state court personnel who regularly face
these situations. By possessing a better understanding of mental disabilities
255. Id. at 24.
256. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xiv.
257. Steadman et al., supra note 160, at 458. See Nancy Wolff & Wendy Pogorzelski,
Measuring the Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 539 (2005).
258. Sandra F. Cannon & Deborah Nixon-Hughes, Community Linkage Program: A
Partnership Between the Ohio Department of Mental Health and the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction, THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO ADVISORY COMM. ON MENTALLY ILL IN
THE CTS. ARTICLE SERIES, 1-2 (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/ACMIC
(last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
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and their symptoms, state court systems can more adequately provide for the
needs of individuals with disabilities and for state judicial systems as a whole.
This principle forms the foundation of the policy for creating and
maintaining mental health courts. Currently, statistical information regarding
the relative successes of mental health courts is very limited. If mental health
courts are more effective in reducing recidivism and providing adequate
treatment for individuals with mental disabilities, it seems fairly certain that
these courts will pass muster under the ADA as a separate, segregated judicial
system, so long as individuals who are diverted into this system still have the
option to participate in the “regular” court system. If mainstream state court
systems are not providing mentally disabled persons with adequate or equal
services and opportunities, both the existing case law and the guidance offered
by the DOJ seem to clearly indicate that mental health courts may even be
required under the ADA so that state court systems are readily accessible to
persons with mental disabilities.
In Lane, the Supreme Court noted that Title II “seeks to enforce a variety
of . . . basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to
more searching judicial review.” 259 The Court noted that the right of access to
the court system is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; the Due Process and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment; as well as
a right to access to criminal proceedings that is guaranteed by the First
Amendment. 260 The Court explained that whether Title II enforces all of these
constitutional rights is a question that “must be judged with reference to the
historical experience which it reflects.” 261 The Court was convinced that Title
II was designed to address harm that often resulted from “a pattern of
unconstitutional treatment in the administration of justice.” 262
The Court carefully examined the history of discrimination based on
disability in this country. 263 “Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of
pervasive unequal treatment . . . in the administration of state services and
programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.” 264
The Lane opinion went on to provide numerous examples of the unequal
treatment of physically and mentally disabled individuals in our society,
including the fact that “as of 1979, most States categorically disqualified idiots
259. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522-23 (2004).
260. Id. at 523 (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court of Cal., County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1986); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
819 n.15 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 379 (1971)).
261. Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).
262. Id. at 525.
263. Id. at 531.
264. Id. at 510.
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from voting, without regard to individual capacity. . . . [A] number of States
have prohibited and continue to prohibit persons with disabilities from
engaging in activities such as marrying and serving as jurors.” 265 The Court
further explained that a long line of Supreme Court cases that “have identified
unconstitutional treatment of disabled persons by state agencies in a variety of
public programs and services[,]” further reinforcing the proposition that
“[d]ifficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies.” 266
Some of the examples of previous cases that implicated disability
discrimination that the Court gave as evidence of a systemic problem included,
“unjustified commitment, the abuse and neglect of persons committed to state
mental health hospitals, and irrational discrimination in zoning decisions.” 267
The Lane opinion makes it clear that state court systems must be readily
accessible to persons with disabilities, which the ADA, the implementing
regulations, and the TAM explicitly state includes persons with mental
disabilities. 268
The TAM is also instructive on the rights of disabled individuals to
participate in programs that are designed without regard for disability status. 269
“Qualified individuals with disabilities are entitled to participate in regular
programs, even if the public entity could reasonably believe that they cannot
benefit from the regular program.” 270 The TAM also clarifies that just because
a special program has been created for persons with a disability, a public entity
must still make its regular programs accessible to disabled individuals,
although the requirement that a disabled individual should be “qualified” to
participate in the program still applies. 271 The TAM also clarifies that a
disabled individual who is qualified for a regular program cannot be denied
access to the regular program because a special program has been created.
Disabled individuals are not required to accept any special “benefits” if they
choose not to do so. 272 The TAM gives some examples of the practical
application of this principle:
ILLUSTRATION 1: A museum cannot exclude a person who is blind from a
tour because of assumptions about his or her inability to appreciate and benefit

265. Lane, 541 U.S. at 524 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 473 U.S. 432,
464 & n.14 (1985)).
266. Id. at 510, 524 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000)).
267. Id. at 524-25 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)).
268. Id. at 533-34. See also United Stated v. Georgia, 126 S.Ct. 877 (2006). In this case, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that Congress had validly abrogated state sovereign immunity under
Title II for claims of violations of the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
269. See TAM, supra note 56, at II-3.4300.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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from the tour experience. Similarly, a deaf person may not be excluded from a
museum concert because of a belief that deaf persons cannot enjoy the music.
ILLUSTRATION 2: Where a State offers special drivers’ licenses with
limitations or restrictions for individuals with disabilities, an individual with a
disability is not eligible for an unrestricted license, unless he or she meets the
essential eligibility requirements for the unrestricted license.
ILLUSTRATION 3: A State that provides optional special automobile license
plates for individuals with disabilities and requires appropriate documentation
for eligibility for the special plates cannot require an individual who qualifies
for a special plate to present documentation or accept a special plate, if he or
she applies for a plate without the special designation. 273

The implementing regulations also provide an example that is instructive as to
whether or not creating separate or special services for the individuals with
disabilities violates the ADA:
[I]t would be a violation of this provision to require persons with disabilities to
eat in the back room of a government cafeteria or to refuse to allow a person
with a disability the full use of recreation or exercise facilities because of
stereotypes about the person’s ability to participate. 274

These illustrations and examples clearly indicate that a public entity, such as a
state’s judicial system, cannot require an individual with a mental disability to
accept diversion into a mental health court if he or she wants to participate in
the mainstream state courts, rather than the special mental health court, even
though the latter may provide particular services that are better suited to fulfill
the needs of that individual.
Two other illustrations from the TAM help clarify when a public entity
may create and provide special or separate programs without running afoul of
the ADA:
ILLUSTRATION 1: Museums generally do not allow visitors to touch exhibits
because handling can cause damage to the objects. A municipal museum may
offer a special tour for individuals with vision impairments on which they are
permitted to touch and handle specific objects on a limited basis. (It cannot,
however, exclude a blind person from the standard museum tour.)
ILLUSTRATION 2: A city recreation department may sponsor a separate
basketball league for individuals who use wheelchairs. 275

It is important to remember that a public entity that creates a special
program for persons with disabilities, such as mental health courts, cannot later
disproportionately cut all programs for the disabled when there are no

273. Id.
274. NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY, supra note 72, at § 35.130.
275. TAM, supra note 56, at II-3.4100.
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alternative equivalent programs available. 276 If a public entity is going to
provide services for individuals who do not have disabilities, then they should
also provide some sort of alternative programming for individuals with
disabilities. 277 If a state’s judicial branch fails to offer persons with mental
disabilities access to the state court system by not effectively treating the
underlying illness or allowing the individual to sufficiently participate in the
judicial system, it seems clear that the state is violating the ADA’s mandate to
provide readily accessible programs and services.
As discussed above, integration is a key goal of the ADA, and this
principle is discernible in all of the aforementioned explanations and
illustrations. Clearly the DOJ, in drafting the implementing regulations and the
TAM, believed that this principle is crucial to eradicating disability
discrimination in American society. While recognizing that the creation of
separate or special programs can be beneficial to individuals with disabilities,
the ADA mandates that state and local governments cannot create these
programs in an attempt to segregate disabled individuals out of regular
programs that are designed without consideration of disabilities. 278
It is important to note that when a public entity’s facilities, services, and
programs are evaluated for conformity with this standard, compliance is
measured by looking at the public entity as a whole. 279 Therefore, a public
entity is not necessarily required to make each of their existing facilities,
programs, and services accessible to individuals with disabilities. 280 The TAM
provides some examples that make this point clearer:
ILLUSTRATION 1: When a city holds a public meeting in an existing
building, it must provide ready access to, and use of, the meeting facilities to
individuals with disabilities. The city is not required to make all areas in the
building accessible, as long as the meeting room is accessible. Accessible
telephones and bathrooms should also be provided where these services are
available for use of meeting attendees.
ILLUSTRATION 2: D, a defendant in a civil suit, has a respiratory condition
that prevents her from climbing steps. Civil suits are routinely heard in a
courtroom on the second floor of the courthouse. The courthouse has no
elevator or other means of access to the second floor. The public entity must
relocate the proceedings to an accessible ground floor courtroom or take
alternative steps, including moving the proceedings to another building, in
order to allow D to participate in the civil suit.
276. See Concerned Parents v. West Palm Beach, 853 F. Supp. 424, 425-26 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(holding that the city effectively discriminated against individuals based on their disabilities when
it ceased providing recreational programs for persons with physical and mental disabilities).
277. Id. at 426.
278. See TAM, supra note 56, at II-3.4000.
279. Id. at II-3.4100, II-5.1000.
280. Id. at II-5.1000.
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ILLUSTRATION 3: A State provides ten rest areas approximately 50 miles
apart along an interstate highway. Program accessibility requires that an
accessible toilet room for each sex with at least one accessible stall, or a unisex
bathroom, be provided at each rest area. 281

Again, if regular mainstream state court systems do not meet the basic
needs of persons with mental disabilities, then the public entity is likely
violating Title II because it is not making its judicial system readily accessible
to persons with mental disabilities. Moreover, if mainstream state courts deny
individuals with mental disabilities with adequate services or equal
opportunities, mental health courts are arguably necessary to bring the state’s
court system into compliance with the ADA.
VI. OHIO’S RESPONSE TO THE MENTAL HEALTH TRENDS
Ohio’s experience with offenders with mental disabilities mirrors that of
the rest of the nation. Since 1995, Ohio has had community linkage programs
in place to provide mental health care to inmates, aid in the transition from
prison to the community and vice versa, and maintain continuous treatment. 282
The need for further intervention, however, became apparent. In March of
2000, Ohio prisons housed 6,393 prisoners with mental disabilities, 3,051 of
whom were severely mentally disabled. 283 A study of 1998 incarceration rates
revealed that 432 of every 100,000 Ohio residents were incarcerated, the
thirteenth highest rate in the nation. 284 As with most of the country, Ohio’s
“community mental health system and the criminal justice system are not
equipped to handle the current situation.” 285
In May of 2000, Akron implemented one of the first programs in the state
designed to address this issue by developing a Crisis Intervention Team
(“CIT”). 286 The CIT was established to encourage collaboration between law
enforcement and the mental health community by training law enforcement
personnel the way to appropriately respond to situations involving individuals

281. Id.
282. See Cannon & Nixon-Hughes, supra note 258.
283. What is a CIT? Why Do You Need One in Your Community?, Interview by Justice
Evelyn Lundberg Stratton with Dr. Mark R. Munetz, Chief Clinical Officer, Summit County
ADM Board & Coordinating Center of Excellence in Jail Diversion, Northeastern Ohio
Universities College of Medicine, THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO ADVISORY COMM. ON MENTALLY ILL
IN THE CTS. ARTICLE SERIES 1 (May 5, 2003), available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/ACMIC
(last visited Apr. 5, 2006) [hereinafter “Munetz Interview”].
284. Jo Ann Harris, What’s a CCOE?, THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO ADVISORY COMM. ON
MENTALLY ILL IN THE CTS. ARTICLE SERIES, 2 (Jan. 2002), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/ACMIC (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
285. Id.
286. Munetz Interview, supra note 283, at 1, 3.
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with mental disabilities. 287 Officers must apply for the CIT training, and the
training is provided to law enforcement personnel for free. 288 As of January
2002, Akron’s CIT program had been relatively successful at diverting persons
with mental disabilities from the criminal justice system. 289 Forty-five percent
of the first 483 law enforcement encounters with individuals with mental
disabilities “resulted in referral to the county’s psychiatric emergency facility
and another 37% were referred to hospital emergency departments.” 290 Only
six percent ended in arrest. 291
Butler County, Ohio became the first county in Ohio to begin inquiring
about the possibility of a mental health court when it held the Southwest Ohio
Regional Forum on Mental Health Courts and the Mentally Ill Offender in
November of 1999. 292 Judge Speiser from the Broward County Mental Health
Court and Judge Cayce from the King County Mental Health Court spoke at
the forum about the development of mental health courts in their respective
jurisdictions. 293 In 2001, Ohio Supreme Court Justice Evelyn Lundberg
Stratton, a major advocate of alternatives for offenders with mental disabilities
in Ohio, created the Ohio Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Mentally Ill
in the Courts. 294 This committee is comprised of various individuals and
entities, such as the state departments of Mental Health, Alcohol, and Drug
Addiction Services, Rehabilitation and Correction, and Criminal Justice
Services, numerous judges and law enforcement officials, housing and
treatment providers, consumer advocacy and legal rights groups, and others. 295
Also in 2000, the Ohio Department of Mental Health (“ODMH”) gave
grants to the following thirteen counties to develop jail diversion programs:
Athens, Clark, Clermont, Columbiana, Fairfield, Franklin, Gallia, Lake,
Licking/Knox, Lucas, Montgomery, Tuscarawas, and Washington. 296 These
counties established various programs such as CIT, pre and post-booking
programs with follow-up after release, case management programs
incorporating housing and vocational components, and referral programs. 297
287. Id. at 1.
288. Id. at 2.
289. Id. at 4.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 4.
292. Rogers, supra note 175, at 3-4.
293. Id. at 4.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Sandra F. Cannon & Joseph Krake, Mental Health Division Alternatives to Jail: Thirteen
Pilot Programs Funded by ODMH in April 2000 – Where are They Now and What Have We
Learned?, THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO ADVISORY COMM. ON MENTALLY ILL IN THE CTS. ARTICLE
SERIES 1-4 (May 2002), available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/ACMIC (last visited Apr. 5,
2006).
297. Id.
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In 2001, the ODMH also awarded a grant to the Summit County Alcohol,
Drug, and Mental Health Services Board to create a Coordinating Center of
Excellence (“CCOE”) to research and support jail diversion alternatives. 298
Furthermore, community-based correctional facilities (“CBCF”) also provide
another diversion option for qualifying offenders. CBCF’s are “residential
programs that provide comprehensive treatment for offenders on felony
probation. They provide an in-house alternative to jail or prison.” 299
Seventeen CBCF’s were operating in Ohio as of September 2002 and had
diverted 4,617 offenders from the state prison system in 2001. 300
As of May 2002, challenges had cropped up, including identifying housing
and employment, integrating multiple local systems and entities, and
encouraging offenders to voluntarily participate. 301
In 2002, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction funded two
pilot projects in Hamilton and Cuyahoga Counties to implement Assertive
Community Treatment (“ACT”) programs. 302 These programs provide
comprehensive services to severely mentally disabled inmates after their
release in an effort to prevent recidivism. 303 Preliminary data evaluations
indicate “decreased usage of jail, prison and psychiatric bed days” as of June
2003. 304 Additionally, Hamilton County also operates a juvenile mental health
court, 305 as well as an intervention program specifically for women offenders
suffering from mental illness and/or substance abuse. 306 As of November
2003, the women’s program had tremendous clinical success: 94% of the
women had reduced their level of symptom distress; 100% of the women
improved their substance abuse behavior, while 94% reduced their substance
abuse attitudes and feelings; 81% of the women improved their overall level of

298. Harris, supra note 284, at 1.
299. Jake E. Jones, Treating the Dual Diagnosed Offender in Your CBCF, THE SUP. CT. OF
OHIO ADVISORY COMM. ON MENTALLY ILL IN THE CTS. ARTICLE SERIES, 1 (Sept. 2002),
available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/ACMIC (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
300. Id.
301. Cannon & Krake, supra note 296, at 4-5.
302. Katherine A. Brown, Assertive Community Treatment: A Reentry Model for Seriously
Mentally Ill Offenders, THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO ADVISORY COMM. ON MENTALLY ILL IN THE CTS.
ARTICLE SERIES, 2 (June 2003), available at http://www.sconmet.state.oh.us/ACMIC (last visited
Apr. 5, 2006).
303. Id. at 1-2.
304. Id. at 3.
305. Sharon Coolidge, Mental Health Court Helping Kids: While Costly Now, It Might Pay
Off for Taxpayers Too, THE KY. ENQUIRER, July 6, 2004, at A1.
306. Mary Grace & Mary Carol Melton, Alternative Interventions for Women: A Community
Partnership Serving Women with Co-occurring Mental Health and Substance Abuse Disorders in
the Criminal Justice System in Hamilton County, Ohio, THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO ADVISORY COMM.
ON MENTALLY ILL IN THE CTS. ARTICLE SERIES, 1 (Nov. 2003), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/ACMIC (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
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functioning; 100% of the graduates had safe and adequate child care; 67% of
the women have safe, adequate, and permanent housing; 47% of the women
had adequate work and attachment to the labor force; and only 13% of those
women who had graduated were convicted of a new crime since completing
the program. 307
Currently, mental health dockets exist in Butler, Cuyahoga, Hamilton,
Mahoning, Montgomery, Richland, and Summit Counties. 308 Five other
counties have mental health/criminal justice programs, and 14 counties are
currently planning similar initiatives. 309 Ohio has also established model jail
standards to deal with offenders with mental disabilities in jail. 310 Clearly,
Ohio has put forth tremendous effort to reverse the “revolving door” problem
whereby “[j]ails and prisons have become the de facto mental health system of
our day” 311 and to combat the challenges that accompany these innovative
solutions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Title II mandates that state and local judicial facilities be accessible to
individuals with disabilities. The increasing number of offenders with mental
disabilities, who are often substance abusers, cycling through criminal justice
systems across the country reveals that meaningful access to the courts is not
occurring. Recent shifts in paradigmatic approaches to special populations
such as drug offenders and offenders with mental disabilities, along with the
advent of specialty drug courts, have lead to the creation of mental health
courts specifically designed to address the needs of the persons with mental
disabilities in order to avoid incarceration. These relatively new interventions
still have flaws that require improvement, but early outcomes in states like
Ohio suggest mental health courts may better serve the purposes of Title II
and, more importantly, the needs of individuals with serious mental
disabilities. Jurisdictions considering implementation of mental health courts,
as well as those jurisdictions that already have them, should take caution to
ensure that personnel are well-trained to recognize and interact with persons
with mental disabilities and that alternative programs truly are voluntary to
avoid violation of Title II.

307. Id. at 4-5.
308. Kristina L. Hawk, The Supreme Court of Ohio Advisory Committee on Mentally Ill in the
Courts: A Catalyst for Change, THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO ADVISORY COMM. ON MENTALLY ILL IN
THE CTS. ARTICLE SERIES 2 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/ACMIC (last
visited Apr. 5, 2006).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 3.
311. Rogers, supra note 175, at 1 (quoting Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton).

